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26 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Conversation of 25 July 1978



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2. Discussed the PRC/North Vietnamese problem. Comment was made that if there is any country that wants to be independent it certainly is Vietnam--this was in connection with their drive to be independent from the Soviets. When I got to the point that they were looking for other external support, it was clear that this morning's

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a. In connection with a chart on infantry forces on the Cambodian border, the question was made why we didn't show any Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia. I said I thought they were making incursions inside but not staying there. I would like to check this.

b. On the question of Vietnamese overtures to Japan for economic aid, the question was asked whether Japan had normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam. I said I didn't know. I would like to find out.

c. Overall I think this was a useful item. I was able to cover it pretty much as in the outline.

3. Soviet Civil Defense. I covered the material very much as per the outline and really by following the charts. It was clear that the import of this new material was of real interest. David Aaron raised the issue of whether we had taken weather into account and I said no, these were strictly theoretical calculations but we recognized that weather could be a major factor. When we came to the issue of what would happen in the first few hours when vulnerability was going up, the point was made the question would have to be asked whether we should evacuate also.

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I added one thing to the briefing at this point that was not in any of our discussions with [] and the others. This was the fact that a President would be in a difficult position not only to decide what he was going to do in the first few hours when their vulnerability was greater and before it began to decline, but how to look on the prospect if the Soviets once went to a civil defense status. I didn't think they could maintain that status for a very long period of time. The conditions would be far too cramped. Therefore, in some sense there would be pressure on the Soviets to make up their mind whether they were going to go to war or not because their economy would be frightfully disrupted and their vulnerability to attack would probably (?) go up if they had to stand down from a full-scale alert, including evacuation. In short, any President would clearly be reluctant to initiate the first strike simply because the Soviets went to a civil defense alert. On the other hand, he would also have to recognize that the danger of war would increase considerably by the fact that they had gone to this posture. I would like the views of [] as to whether that really holds true. 25X1

4. Microcircuits. Went through this one as per my revised outline. There was a lot of interest in the exhibits, both the pictures and the physical ones. The question was asked whether the hybrids weren't put together by hand and I said yes. The point on the vulnerability of the connections was very clear and easily understood.

a. I had built the presentation largely around the COCOM issue, both at the beginning and at the end.

b. The Vice President asked whether the Soviets were attempting to market their computers. I said I thought they were more likely to market components but not actual computers, at least in the West.

c. Again I think the briefing was worthwhile. I pointed out I was not specifically in favor or opposed to changing the COCOM rules, but there was an area of Soviet concern of vulnerability.

5. Turkish Embargo. Presented the item very quickly.



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Director

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